This page presents an introduction to and analysis of the dilemma. It does so through the integration of real-world scenarios and case studies, examination of emerging economy contexts and exploration of the specific business risks posed by the dilemma. It also suggests a range of actions that responsible companies can take in order to manage and mitigate those risks.
“How does a company ensure respect for the human rights of local communities when circumstances dictate that they must rely on the protection of public security forces with a history of committing human rights violations?”
The dilemma for responsible business is how to ensure the responsible protection of people and assets, whilst at the same time relying on public security providers over which it has limited control. Companies will often prefer to rely on public security providers for protection, for reasons of costs and accountability. This will only be the case, however, where such providers are characterised by high levels of professionalism, legitimate government control, legal oversight and respect for human rights. Ironically, this will generally be in areas where no such protection is required.
Where public security provision is imperative (for example in areas of weak governance, conflict and post-conflict conditions), companies are more likely to enter into relationships with security forces with questionable human rights records. In some operational environments, enlisting a public security provider might be an attractive choice to protect company personnel and assets.
Alternatively, circumstances may dictate that the company is obliged to rely on public security forces if they are to proceed with their operations. Taking this route may be a matter of law (for example in the general provision of law and order by the government), government insistence (for example in relation to ‘strategic’ national projects) or even extortionate demands by security forces themselves.
Such situations will often present a dilemma to companies in terms of whether they should proceed with an operation at all (i.e. whether the benefits outweigh the risks). A variable in this decision-making process will be the extent to which a company believes it will be able to exercise a degree of influence or control over public security providers.
In February 2010, Amnesty International claimed police in Papua New Guinea burnt down homes and threatened people with guns in April 2009 during what they termed an illegal eviction. The alleged incident took place next to a mine 95% owned and operated by subsidiaries of Canadian-based Barrick Gold Corp. as part of the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV). Amnesty raised concerns about “ongoing support” provided to the police by the PJV partners, which reportedly takes the form of logistical assistance. Barrick has disputed Amnesty’s interpretation of the incident.
In September 2009, EarthRights International issued a report, Total Impact, criticising Total and Chevron for their involvement in Myanmar’s Yadana Gas Project. The report alleges a range of serious human rights abuses by the Burmese military units guarding the project, including alleged killings, torture and forced labour. The report says Total “misrepresented” its relationship with the Burmese military – and that it is closer than previously claimed. The report also claims the company “whitewashed its complicity” through flawed impact assessments and inflated promotion of its socio-economic programmes.
In March 2009, the US Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) warned that it may divest from companies that operate in Sudan – including PetroChina (China), CNPC Hong Kong (China), the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (India), Sinopec (China) and Petronas (Malaysia). This threat was primarily due to the actions of Sudanese forces in Darfur, which the US continues to brand as “genocide”.
Companies are likely to come across this dilemma in a number of situations, including those where:
Security can be provided on three broad bases:
In many parts of the world, local public security forces will have a history of abusing the human rights of local communities and other groups. Typical forms of abuse can range from the relatively minor (such as illegitimate surveillance and intimidation) to the very serious (such as sexual violence and unlawful killings).
In some cases, general public security provision will have to be accepted in order for relevant projects to proceed – whether as a matter of law, public policy or contract.
Companies will often consider it preferable to employ responsible and legitimate public security providers for their protection when operating in environments characterised by instability and/or high levels of criminality. Taking this route will free companies from having to employ private security providers – usually at considerable cost. In addition, in cases where local governance is stronger, public security forces are likely to enjoy a higher degree of social, legal and political legitimacy compared to private security forces, as well as the political and financial backing of government authorities.
Similarly, governments will often prefer that companies do not employ armed private security forces. This is due to concerns about national sovereignty, the legitimate monopoly on the use of force and issues of accountability and control. In certain cases, governments are likely to be particularly keen to ensure their security forces support company activity. For example:
Extractive projects will often be of strategic importance to the country of operation, located in remote areas and may even play a direct role in local instability (e.g. due to community unrest or efforts by rival groups to control revenue-generating assets). Host governments will often have a direct interest in the project (e.g. through a joint venture or production sharing agreement) and be highly motivated to ensure its safety and continuity (e.g. maintenance of public revenues). Governments will also be keen to demonstrate their ability to provide a secure and stable operating/investment environment
An example includes a November 2007 announcement by the government of Saudi Arabia detailing the formation of a special 35,000-strong rapid reaction force to protect its energy installations from attacks by militants.
Likewise, in February 2010, it was reported that the Ugandan army was creating a special unit to protect strategic assets including the oil fields located in the Lake Albert basin. Two out of the three fields, which border relatively unstable parts of eastern DR Congo, are being developed by UK-based Tullow Oil.1
Major infrastructure projects (such as dams, energy generation, roads, etc.) will often be of political and strategic relevance for host governments. The reasoning behind this is two-fold: 1) such projects are often funded by, or carried out on behalf of the government and 2) such projects represent substantial and visible actions by the government to promote national development (and so garner political support)
For example, the Amnesty International Report 2008 reports that in June 2007, four people were killed and 11 wounded by the Sudanese police during peaceful protests against the Kajbar Dam in the north of the country. The protests related to the displacement of local communities and followed a similar incident at the Merowe Dam in April 2006, where three civilians protesting against its construction were reportedly killed in clashes with police. Companies involved in the project include the China International Water and Electric Corporation (building), Alstom of France (power generation equipment), Harbin Power Engineering of China (power engineering) and a range of local companies.
Defence-related products or services (e.g. arms sales and training, related technology projects, engineering projects, etc.) are likely to be subject to strong public security protection. In some cases, companies will be in a direct commercial relationship with a country’s military, which will set many of the operational conditions
In many parts of the developing world, however, public security forces will often have a history of human rights abuse. This is particularly common in the following scenarios:
Repressive governments that are not subject to the rule of law and which use public security forces to maintain political control in the absence of democratic legitimacy
An example of this can be found in Myanmar, where the state is controlled by the armed forces via the ruling junta. Total’s Yadana gas project (in which Chevron is also involved) has generated considerable controversy due to allegations of complicity with the actions of the military, including those relating to forced labour and other serious violations. The controversy has been accentuated by Total’s refusal to leave the country despite the exit of a number of other Western corporations as a result of sustained activism.
Political instability and/or conflict, meaning legitimate public security forces have a mandate for strong action and are subject to only limited civilian control (whether through the government or the courts)
An example of this can be found in Nigeria, where the military – including the recently created Joint Task Force – has been tasked with suppression of active militancy and criminality in the Niger Delta. Violence in the region has seen numerous attacks and kidnappings targeting multi-national oil companies, such as Shell, Chevron and Agip, as well as state assets. In May 2009, for example, Amnesty International reported that initial action by the Joint Task Force (including use of helicopter gunships) killed at least 100 civilians and displaced 10,000.2
Instability and weak governance, meaning public security forces of questionable legitimacy essentially act on an independent basis with little or no civilian oversight
An example of this can be found in eastern DR Congo, where some ‘integrated’ units made up of former anti-government rebels are nominally part of the national armed forces, but which in reality operate independently and at great cost to the local population. In March 2009, for example, the UN’s Second Joint Report of Seven United Nations Experts on the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo noted that “Members of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) [including ‘integrated brigades’], the National Congolese Police (PNC), the National Intelligence Agency (ANR) and other intelligence forces have been reported as being responsible for summary executions, sexual violence, torture and ill-treatment.” In part, this appears to be due to weak central control, a lack of effective judicial enforcement and ineffective institutions.
Poorly trained and financed security forces can present a serious challenge, even when they are acting on behalf of and under the general control of legitimate governments. Problems will not necessarily appear at unit-level, but may instead be manifested through individual acts of ill discipline and independent action. Likewise, poor funding (and non-payment of salaries in particular) is likely to result in corruption and criminality.
These issues can be found in Mexico, for example, where members of the internal security forces have been accused of corruption and severe human rights abuses. The US Department of State 2009 Human Rights Report on Mexico cites the National Human Rights Commission as reporting that "police, especially at the state and local level, were involved in kidnapping, extortion, and in providing protection for, or acting directly on behalf of, organised crime and drug traffickers. Local forces in particular tended to be poorly compensated and directly pressured by criminal groups, leaving them most vulnerable to infiltration.”
In rare cases companies may directly commission human rights violations or other activities that result in infringements on individual rights. Whilst multi-national companies are highly unlikely to partake in such activities, they may nonetheless find themselves accused of complicity where suppliers, local business partners or host governments act unscrupulously.
Within a company, this might include the use of security personnel to:
Outside of a company, this might include the use of security personnel to:
Examples of scenarios companies might face when operating in emerging economies include:
Brazil: Land disputes in rural areas of Brazil often turn violent. Multi-nationals have been targeted by landless workers’ movements in the form of raids, protests and sabotage. Multi-nationals, as well as legal and illegal landowners, often engage public and private security forces to protect business operations and employees in areas that are difficult to police. Conflicts between landowners and landless workers and indigenous peoples have reportedly led to human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, forced evictions and torture.
India: The majority of extrajudicial and unlawful killings in India arise in the context of internal armed conflicts and separatist, ethnic and communal violence. The South Asia Terrorism Portal notes that in 2009, 2,226 people died in terrorism-related violence – with most killings concentrated in Jammu and Kashmir, Assam and Manipur. The security forces have been accused of carrying out widespread human rights violations, including killings, torture and excessive use of force with impunity.
Egypt: Violent radical Islamist groups represent a security risk. In recent years, Egypt has seen a new terrorist threat emerge in the Sinai Peninsula, with three major attacks on tourist resorts in 2004, 2005 and 2006 that killed over 100 people. In this context, Egypt’s security forces have been accused of a range of human rights violations, including torture, ill-treatment, harassment and unlawful killings in an environment of impunity.
Indonesia: The Indonesian security forces reportedly carry out extrajudicial killings and torture, including the use of excessive force and sexual violence, with impunity. Such violations have also occurred in the context of business operations. Allegations have also been made that, in some cases, the security forces create contexts in which their services are required to maintain order so as to reap financial benefits.
Mexico: Human rights risk in Mexico is predominantly linked to escalating drug-related violence. Powerful drug cartels, most active in the northern regions around Ciudad Juárez, are waging a high impact campaign of intimidation and murder that continues to result in serious violations of human security. The ‘war on drugs’ has reportedly led to widespread human rights violations, including unlawful killings, rape, torture and arbitrary detention by the state security forces.
Philippines: The Philippines is currently engaged in internal armed conflicts with a number of armed groups. Armed groups have on occasion threatened business interests through extortion and violence. In response, the government has announced plans to increase militarisation of mining sites using guards from the paramilitary group Citizens Armed Force Geographical Unit, rather than the state security forces. Counterinsurgency security forces have reportedly been responsible for human rights violations including extrajudicial killings, torture and enforced disappearances.
Turkey: Turkey’s village guards, who are concentrated in the southeast of the country, are considered to be less disciplined and professional than other security forces. They are regularly implicated in theft, rape and other human rights violations. Inadequate oversight and compensation of village guards from the central government is believed to account for their behaviour.
Contraventions of local law by public security providers – whether related to human rights or not – should result in criminal charges against the perpetrators. In practice, this is often not the case due to weak governance, uncertain rule of law or government complicity. This – as well as the ‘arms-length’ relationship that usually exists between public security providers and businesses – means that criminal charges of corporate complicity are relatively unlikely.
More commonly, companies may face civil claims – either at a domestic or international level. The US provides a favoured forum for claims of this nature, as the Alien Tort Claims Act allows foreign citizens a means by which to initiate actions for legal torts committed outside of the US.
High profile legal cases in the US relating to alleged company complicity in human rights abuses by public security forces include:
The US is not the only jurisdiction in which such cases are being adjudicated. In October 2009, litigation was launched in the UK against British mining company Monterrico Metals after protesters were detained and allegedly tortured at a copper plant in northern Peru. The protesters claim one of the wounded was left to bleed to death at the mine and that mine security personnel worked closely with the police during the incident.
Even where allegations of complicity do not result in legal action, companies can still face a range of non-legal risks. These can be of a short term nature (e.g. operational disruptions as a result of community unrest aimed at public security forces and/or the company) or of a long term nature (e.g. sustained consumer campaigns that ultimately require a change in company strategy or policy with respect to the country in question).
These can include:
A prime example of the kinds of risks faced by companies, includes the sustained campaign against a range of companies that have historically operated in Myanmar. Activist group Burma Campaign UK maintains, for example, an online Dirty List of companies with business ties to Myanmar. These include, French communications technology company Alcatel, Chevron, Daewoo International, Lloyd’s of London (and other insurance bodies), Maersk, Mitsubushi Corp, Nippon Oil, Petronas, Schlumberger Oilfield Services, Siemens, Total and Toyota. Burma Campaign UK claims the Dirty List has “forced over 100 countries to pull out of Burma”, including Rolls Royce.
Likewise, there is an active movement to boycott companies with business links in Sudan. This includes Investors Against Genocide, which runs a shareholder proposal campaign to advance ‘genocide-free’ investing. In particular it focuses on “four major oil companies that are partnering with the Government of Sudan and helping to fund the genocide in Darfur”. These include PetroChina, Sinopec, ONGC of India and Petronas of Malaysia. Examples include divestment by American Funds of US$190 million of PetroChina assets in February 2010, as well as divestment by the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association, College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) from all holdings in PetroChina, CNPC, Sinopec and ONGC (worth US$58 million).
For a company to responsibly address public security forces and human rights, it should first look to comply with relevant national laws. Where national laws are set lower than international standards on security forces and human rights, then companies should strive to meet these higher standards.
A company would also be well advised to engage in human rights due diligence to a level commensurate with the risk of infringements posed by its business activities. For example, conducting human rights impact assessments and/or social audits will allow companies to get a concrete sense of the ways in which they could minimise infringements inflicted by security forces and discharge their responsibility to respect human rights.
Other specific actions can include:6
Adhere to the terms of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. Actions should include:
Current participants in the Voluntary Principles includes seven governments (including the US, UK and Canada) and nine NGOs (including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch).8 Corporate participants include:
| AngloGold Ashanti | Hess Corporation |
| Anglo American | Marathon Oil |
| BG Group | Newmont Mining Corporation |
| BHP Billiton | Occidental Petroleum Corporation |
| BP | Rio Tinto |
| Chevron | Shell |
| ConocoPhillips | Statoil |
| ExxonMobil | Talisman Energy |
| Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold |
Encourage the development of a transparent and well publicised multilateral security agreement that includes:
These can help establish clear, broad-based and recognised ‘rules’ by which security will be provided – as well as the respective responsibilities of all parties concerned. In the event of violations by public security providers, stakeholders can use the terms of such an agreement as a means of exerting appropriate pressure on public security providers.
For example, in 2006 BP established a committee to promote structured dialogue with communities along the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan and South Caucasus oil and gas pipelines. Known as the Inter-Agency Security Committee, it included representatives from local police forces and government agencies, as well as security officers and trained community liaison officers from BP. In 2007, 6,000 villagers also attended group meetings, as did pipeline technicians. As a result of the engagement, BP says the number of complaints fell, and those that were made were dealt with effectively due to the established relationships between the parties.
Utilise any available leverage with public security forces to promote respect for human rights in the course of their duties. For example:
For example, BP includes human rights and security provisions in several of its investment agreements. These include a bilateral security protocol for its Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil project, the Shah Deniz gas project, the South Caucasus gas pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline – and all future assets in Azerbaijan.
In addition, Freeport-McMoRan provides in-kind assistance and monetary living/hardships allowances to government-provided security forces at PT Freeport Indonesia. This support runs alongside human rights training that in 2008 included 875 host police and military personnel.
Where due diligence has shown that the public security force options cannot be relied on to protect human rights, propose the use of well trained and responsible private armed security providers. Ensure that the company’s contracts with any such private security providers include relevant conditions relating to:
Efforts should also be made to provide a degree of comfort to local public security officials by giving them an (appropriate) degree of operational influence over the use of private security providers (e.g. rules of engagement, deployment, etc.). Companies should only select private armed security providers with a record of professional conduct, and which are members of industry associations with relevant policies and codes of conduct to encourage good practice such as the British Association of Private Security Companies.
Provide/fund human rights training to relevant public security personnel to ensure a common understanding of:
Training should be carried out in cooperation with security force commanders and other relevant public officials.
For example, in 2008 BP supported progressive human rights training for public security forces (as well as its own guards) at its Tangguh LNG project in West Papua, Indonesia. The initiative was conducted through an external consultancy and two senior Indonesian police instructors. Training was also provided for members from two regional police units in Bintuni and Fak-Fak, as well as members of the national police’s mobile brigade.
In 2008 Newmont Mining also provided training on the Voluntary Principles to all public security officers assigned to their Yanacocha operation in Peru.
In addition, Freeport-McMoRan provides security training to government security officials where feasible. Its PT Freeport Indonesia operation has developed a range of training materials including videos for security personnel for use in DR Congo, Chile and Peru.
Establish and publicise an independent, rights-compatible grievance mechanism to allow employees and local communities and stakeholders to lodge complaints (whether anonymous or not) regarding security practices or the behaviour of public security providers. This will:
For example, Anglo American’s Speak-Up program channels complaints to an external service provider that then forwards these in anonymous form to a response team within the company.10
Encourage the formation of a community liaison committee with the following composition:
This will provide a forum by which communities can voice recommendations, concerns and grievances in an informal and constructive way. Inaugurating this channel of communication can help ensure security arrangements remain responsive to community needs and reduce the chances of friction and conflict that may ultimately give rise to human rights violations. It can also keep the company informed of the human rights performance of relevant public security forces, allowing it to take early action with respect to potential challenges before they occur.
For example, Freeport-McMoRan has a Human Rights Policy that requires each operating site to establish its own Human Rights Compliance Officer. They serve as liaison points for site-based departments, including security, human resources and community affairs – as well as public security officials. The goal of this role is to ensure that reported human rights violations are documented, investigated and resolved in a timely fashion.
Public security providers can broadly be broken down into the following types:
Public security forces should provide effective protection to the civilian population against human rights violations, while acting within the law and under the control of civil authority. Governments have the primary responsibility to promote and protect human rights, which includes ensuring that its security forces do not themselves commit human rights violations.
However, governments do not always fulfil this responsibility. In many cases public security forces are the worst perpetrators of human rights abuses. According to the Maplecroft's Security Forces and Human Rights Index 2012, the 10 highest risk countries (all of which are considered to present an ‘Extreme Risk’) are:
| Iran | Myanmar |
| North Korea | Somalia |
| South Sudan | Sudan |
| Libya | DR Congo |
| Afganistan | Pakistan |
Companies operating in emerging economies are often faced with significant security challenges. Such challenges regularly arise in countries where the security forces, paramilitaries, and private security companies have a history of committing human rights violations. This may be as a result of current or previous armed conflict, because the security forces are corrupt and ill-disciplined, or there are significant governance gaps.
Ironically, the attributes of operating environments that make the need for enlisting security personnel most compelling (e.g. political instability, conflict and insurgency, weak civilian control, public repression, etc.), also make it unlikely that security forces will act in a legitimate, controlled and responsible way.
This is reflected in the fact that seven out of the 10 countries that represent the highest risk to human security are the same countries that represent the highest risks with respect to security forces and human rights. According to the Maplecroft's Human Security Risk Index 2012, the 10 highest risk countries (all of which are considered to present an ‘Extreme Risk’) are:
| Sudan | DR Congo |
| Afganistan | Somalia |
| Yemen | Iraq |
| Pakistan | Nigeria |
| Central African Republic | Chad |
Post-conflict countries, such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and others are also likely to pose particular challenges in this respect. Whilst they are not ranked as ‘Extreme Risk’, public security personnel in these countries have often been conditioned by years of violence, have ready access to firearms and have developed a culture in which the use of excessive violence is relatively normal.
Human rights that are typically subject to violations by repressive and/or ill disciplined public security forces include:
Website: By 
Maplecroft in partnership with the United Nations Global Compact
